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Abstract
We examine the relationship between board-level codetermination and corporate social 
responsibility in German companies, engaging with two distinct literatures. Most quantitative 
studies of codetermination focus on its economic impact, with little attention to other outcomes. 
Studies of corporate social responsibility rarely consider the role of worker representatives. 
Our new measure of the strength of codetermination, the Mitbestimmungsindex (MB-ix), shows 
a positive relationship with ‘substantive’ policies such as the adoption of targets for reducing 
pollution, but not with ‘symbolic’ policies, such as membership of the UN Global Compact. We 
therefore shed new light on the role of codetermination and provide a more differentiated view 
of the spread of what has been termed ‘explicit’ corporate social responsibility in Germany.
Keywords
Codetermination, corporate social responsibility, sustainability, worker participation
Introduction
This article examines the relationship between board-level codetermination and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) in German companies, building a bridge between two almost 
completely separate research fields (Harvey et al., 2017). Although it is not the only coun-
try with ‘workers on the board’ (Gold et al., 2010), codetermination was introduced much 
earlier in Germany than elsewhere (Dukes, 2005). Furthermore, the proportion of board 
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members who are worker representatives is particularly high in comparative perspective, 
reaching parity with shareholder representatives in large German companies.
Given these special characteristics, it is not surprising that German codetermination has 
attracted considerable research interest. At the time of writing, we are aware of 37 quantita-
tive studies (a list can be found in our online appendix) examining the relationship between 
codetermination and company performance in Germany (for a review, see Jirjahn, 2010). 
However, these studies for the most part address a narrow set of outcomes, mainly financial 
variables like stock market performance and profitability. The relationship between code-
termination and company policies with respect to the environment and society, referred to 
here as CSR, is almost completely unexplored in the literature.
The second field of research we address focuses on the determinants of CSR 
(sometimes referred to as ‘sustainability’) at firm level. Although this literature has 
expanded greatly over the past 2 decades, few studies look at the role of workers or 
trade unions (for an exception, see Jackson and Bartosch, 2016). Instead, most pay 
attention to consumers, shareholders and NGOs (Carroll and Brown, 2018; Harvey 
et al., 2017). This is surprising given that employees are among the primary 
stakeholders.
To help bridge the gap between these two literatures, we ask whether there is a rela-
tionship between the strength of codetermination and CSR in German firms. To answer 
this question, we report some of the results of a research project to construct a codeter-
mination index (MB-ix). This project has three aims: first, to develop a differentiated 
measure of the strength of codetermination, capturing the institutional variation among 
German companies in the ability of workers to express ‘voice’ in corporate governance; 
second, to expand research on the impact of codetermination beyond economic perfor-
mance and third, to examine the development of codetermination over a long time frame 
(initially 2006–2015). (For more information on this project, see www.mitbestimmung.
de/mbix)
The next section presents this new measure of codetermination, describing its con-
struction and providing some descriptive data. We then summarize selected aspects of 
the discussion on CSR, particularly those dealing with comparative research. Next, we 
describe an empirical test of the determinants of different types of CSR policies in 
German companies, and show that codetermination strength is positively related to ‘sub-
stantive’ but not to ‘symbolic’ CSR policies. The concluding section focuses on the rel-
evance of these results for the literatures on codetermination and CSR.
Measuring the strength of worker influence: the 
codetermination index (MB-ix)
Strong codetermination is seen by many observers as a key institution in the German 
political economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Streeck, 1984). Codetermination is consid-
ered an insurance mechanism for protecting workers’ investments in firm-specific skills, 
which are essential for the production of high-quality, customized goods. Furthermore, 
codetermination supports a ‘bottom-up’ approach to incremental innovation based on 
input from the shop floor.
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Despite numerous quantitative studies of German codetermination, how it affects 
company performance has not yet been definitively answered. An analysis of the 37 
quantitative studies known to the authors shows that most researches have focused on 
financial variables, thereby neglecting other possible impacts (see Table 1). The most 
frequent topics examined are stock market performance (14 of the 37 studies), company 
profitability (13 times) and productivity (7 times). Recently, management remuneration 
has also become popular (6 times). Few studies look at core issues for worker representa-
tives, such as wages, employment levels and changes in employment. Thus, the types of 
variables where one would expect worker representatives to have the greatest impact 
have been rarely examined. The link between codetermination and CSR in German firms 
has been neglected in quantitative studies.
A further limitation of the existing studies is that, with only six exceptions, worker 
influence in all companies with a specific type of codetermination has been treated as 
homogeneous. There are three types of codetermination in German companies, each of 
which has different rules for representing workers (see Rosenbohm and Haipeter, 2019): 
one-third representation in smaller firms under the 2004 Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz; in 
larger firms under the 1976 Mitbestimmungsgesetz, parity representation but with a cast-
ing vote for the shareholder-appointed chair and in Montan firms in the steel and mining 
sectors, parity representation with a neutral chair.
Most quantitative studies have assumed that worker influence is equal in all parity 
codetermined firms. However, qualitative research has shown substantial variation 
within each codetermination type. For example, a number of traditional ‘paternalistic’ 
firms and newer ‘high tech’ firms have resisted the formation of works councils and the 
election of external trade union officials to supervisory boards, which tends to weaken 
worker voice (Girndt, 2006). Furthermore, unions tend to focus more on the largest com-
panies in their sectors (Raabe, 2010). Thus, the assumption of equality between firms 
with the same codetermination rights neglects important variation.
A second argument for a more differentiated measure is new legislation at EU level 
which defines procedures for negotiating rules on codetermination in specific situations. 
This includes the 2001 European Company Statute, the 2003 European Cooperative 
Society Directive and the 2005 Directive on Cross-border Mergers. In all three cases, 
negotiations between management and worker representatives may result in an agree-
ment on worker participation which deviates substantially from either the ‘parity’ or 
‘one-third’ models (Weiß, 2016).
To address these gaps, a project was launched at the WZB in 2014. The first ambition 
is to develop a differentiated measure of board-level codetermination in German 
Table 1. Main topics of 37 quantitative studies of German codetermination.
Number of times studied
Share value Profit Productivity Executive pay Wages Other
14 13 7 6 5 18
Source: authors’ own analysis.
Items add up to more than 37 because of the studies with multiple subjects.
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companies. This index (the Mitbestimmungsindex or MB-ix), developed with input from 
experts and practitioners, consists of six components. Each component takes a value 
between 0 and 100 and the overall measure MB-ix, which is a weighted average of all six 
components, also varies from 0 to 100 (Scholz and Vitols, 2016, 2018).
The first component measures the number and type of worker representatives on the 
supervisory board, where final decisions on key policies such as dividends, large invest-
ments and mergers and acquisitions are taken. This component takes into account both 
the proportion of worker representatives on the board and the extent to which they are 
connected to a works council or trade union, since articulation with other levels of col-
lective representation will increase the strategic capacity of board level representatives 
(Jürgens et al., 2008). The highest score for this component is reached if half the super-
visory board members are worker representatives, all the internal employee representa-
tives (those working for the company) are works councillors and all trade union 
representatives are full-time officials.
The second component relates to the deputy chair of the supervisory board, who con-
sults the chair to prepare meetings of the full board and to make emergency decisions 
between meetings. In some companies, there are two deputy chairs. In companies with 
strong codetermination, one of these deputies is supposed to be a worker representative. 
The full score for this component is reached if there is only one deputy chair, and this 
person is either an external trade union official or works councillor.
The third component measures the extent of worker representation on board com-
mittees. Since these committees take important decisions and formulate recommenda-
tions to the full supervisory board, the proportion of worker representatives has an 
important influence on their output (Höpner and Müllenborn, 2010). The full score for 
this component is achieved if half the members on all the key committees are worker 
representatives.
The fourth component focuses on the degree of fragmentation of worker representa-
tion through the internationalization of employment. The lower the proportion of 
employees in the ‘home’ country of a multinational, the more difficult it is to organize 
workers’ voice, given the diversity of national industrial relations systems. However, a 
European or an international works council is a forum for worker representatives from 
different countries to coordinate their voice (Waddington, 2010). The highest score for 
this component is achieved if all employees are in Germany (no fragmentation across 
national boundaries); or otherwise, if there is a European or an international works coun-
cil to coordinate workers’ voice across borders.
The fifth component measures the importance of the supervisory board in the corporate 
governance of the firm. The decision-making powers of the supervisory board, which are 
defined by law, vary quite substantially across different company legal forms (Köstler 
et al., 2013). If the supervisory board has limited powers relative to the shareholders’ 
assembly, the potential for worker representatives to influence company decisions will also 
be limited. The full score for this component is reached if the company has a legal form 
which defines extensive decision-making rights for the supervisory board.
Finally, the sixth component assesses where responsibility for personnel policy is 
located in the management board. If this is with the chief executive officer (CEO) or the 
chief financial officer (CFO), personnel policy will tend to be subordinated to the 
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financial priorities of the company (Giertz and Scholz, 2018). This is in part because 
these types of managers tend to interact most extensively with shareholders. The full 
score for this component is obtained if primary responsibility for personnel policy is not 
assigned to the CEO or CFO.
One aim of the project is to trace the development of codetermination strength over a 
longer time period. Initial data collection was for the 10 years 2006–2015 inclusive. For 
each year, the sample includes all companies in the major stock indexes DAX (largest 30 
firms), MDAX (50 mid-size firms), SDAX (50 small firms) and TecDAX (30 technology 
firms), which by definition adds up to 160 companies. In addition, data were collected for 
the parity codetermined companies listed on the stock market, which are not in a major 
index; this number varied between 30 and 35 during the period. In all, data on 1924 
company-years are included. As there is a certain amount of fluctuation in index member-
ship from year to year, 285 companies were in the whole sample for at least 1 year.
As expected, there is substantial variation in the distribution of MB-ix scores. Values 
for the 192 companies in the study in 2015 (the latest year for which we have complete 
data) can be seen in Table 2. Six percent of the companies in the sample received the 
highest score (MB-ix = 100), whereas 30 percent had no codetermination (MB-ix = 0). 
There are even cases where workers’ voice is stronger in companies with one-third par-
ticipation than in some companies with parity codetermination; three companies with 
one-third participation had MB-ix values higher than the parity codetermined company 
with the lowest MB-ix value.
Comparative perspectives on CSR
Much CSR literature focuses on the determinants of policies at the firm level (Aguinis 
and Glavas, 2012), for example, in the role of stakeholders in pressurizing firms into 
adopting specific policies. However, the stakeholders that are typically considered are 
consumers, NGOs and responsible investors, to the almost complete neglect of trade 
unions and works councils (Harvey et al., 2017).
Although most CSR studies focus on one country, some researchers have used large 
multi-country datasets to take a comparative approach. Catering to the growing demands 
of investors for consideration of ‘ethical’ criteria or reputational risks in their investment 
decisions, ratings companies such as Sustainable Asset Management, ASSET4 and 
Table 2. MB-ix distribution in German companies, 2015.
MB-ix Values n %
MB-ix = 100 11 6
100 > MB-ix ⩾ 90 32 17
90 > MB-ix ⩾ 80 26 14
80 > MB-ix ⩾ 70 30 16
70 > MB-ix ⩾ 0 35 18
MB-ix = 0 58 30
Total 192 100
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Vigeo/Eiris gather data on the CSR policies and performance of thousands of companies 
around the world. As CSR is understood to span a number of dimensions such as the 
environment, social issues (including labour practices, diversity policies and human 
rights) and corporate governance, these datasets include hundreds of data points for each 
year for each company examined.
A key question is, in what kinds of countries do firms have better CSR performance? 
Two theses predominate. The first is that CSR has emerged as a substitute for govern-
ment regulation. As governments in the past few decades have deregulated important 
areas such as labour markets, firms are pressurized by stakeholders to adopt CSR poli-
cies to fill the gap, or do so voluntarily. This has been labelled ‘explicit’ CSR (Matten 
and Moon, 2008), as firms attempt to get public credit and legitimacy for these policies. 
This approach expects that CSR policies will be most common in countries with weak 
regulation: ‘liberal market economies’ such as the UK and USA (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Evidence has been found in support of this thesis (Jackson and Apostolakou, 
2010; Kinderman, 2012).
The contrary thesis is that CSR functions as a mirror of national institutions. 
According to this view, CSR policies will be more prevalent in countries that have 
strong states and coordinated industry associations. This has been labelled ‘implicit’ 
CSR, as firms implement such policies mainly in response to government requirements 
or collective pressure. This approach expects to find stronger CSR policies in ‘coordi-
nated market economies’, such as Germany and the Nordic countries. Evidence for the 
validity of this second view has also been found (Campbell, 2007; Favotto et al., 2016; 
Gjølberg, 2010).
Some recent comparative research has provided a more differentiated view by arguing 
that both hypotheses may be partially true. Looking at membership in CSR associations, 
Kinderman and Lutter (2018) argue that CSR will initially be more prevalent in liberal 
market economies, but as it becomes more established, coordinated market economies 
will have an advantage. Jackson and Bartosch (2016), in one of the few studies that 
include the strength of worker participation at the national level as an explanatory vari-
able, show that works council rights are positively related to social and human rights 
elements in CSR policies but negatively related to charitable spending. Matten and Moon 
(2008: 416), the originators of the implicit/explicit distinction, note that ‘explicit’ CSR 
policies seem to be spreading from the USA to Europe. One reason they give is the 
‘deregulation of labor markets and the weakening position of trade unions … In cases of 
redundancy … European companies increasingly assume responsibility for fulfilling 
stakeholder expectations rather than relying on welfare state institutions’. However, they 
claim that explicit policies are largely restricted to larger companies and are driven by 
government policies and industry associations.
These results suggest a need for further research into the determinants of different 
types of CSR policies. As the influence of national institutions may differ across firms 
(codetermination legislation may apply only to specific kinds of companies), more dif-
ferentiated measures of institutions at the firm level would be appropriate. Second, as 
types of policies differ across broad areas such as ‘social’ and ‘environment’, a more 
detailed examination of specific CSR policies might shed more light on the ‘substitute’ 
versus ‘mirror’ controversy.
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A distinction in the literature between ‘symbolic’ and ‘substantive’ CSR actions is 
relevant for this discussion. Schons and Steinmeier (2016) define the difference as 
follows:
While symbolic CSR actions are any actions related to CSR topics that a firm takes to show 
ceremonial conformity, substantive CSR actions involve actual changes at an operational level, 
generally implying tangible and measurable activity that requires the use of a firm’s resources. 
(p. 359)
We would expect that workers as stakeholders would have little interest in symbolic 
CSR but would be supportive of substantive CSR actions that would improve their situ-
ation, such as less exposure to pollution at the workplace.
MB-ix and CSR in German companies
Data and hypotheses
We now describe an empirical test of the relationship between the strength of codetermi-
nation and CSR in German companies. Data on CSR policies in 96 firms for 2006–2014 
were selected from the ratings company ASSET4 as indicators of different types of CSR 
policies (a more detailed description of the data can be found in our online appendix). 
The first two variables are indicators for ‘symbolic’ CSR policies, as they are oriented 
mainly at external legitimation, with little, if any, change at the operational level. We 
present the ASSET4 description of the variable in italics followed by our motivation for 
using the variable:
•• GLOB_COMP: Has the company signed the UN Global Compact? The UN 
Global Compact has been analysed as a high-visibility initiative which, however, 
makes few substantive demands on companies for implementing CSR policies. 
Companies are asked to sign up to 10 principles but ‘all credible and publicly 
available data and documentation conclusively demonstrate that the UNGC has 
failed to induce its signatory companies to enhance their CSR efforts and integrate 
the 10 principles in their policies and operations’ (Sethi and Schepers, 2014: 193). 
Membership can thus be considered a symbolic CSR policy.
•• PUB_COMM: Has there been a public commitment from a senior management or 
board member to integrate [environmental, social and governance] issues into 
the company strategy and day-to-day decision making? This indicator is purely a 
measure of public statements by key persons in the company, and as such it can be 
considered a second indicator for symbolic CSR.
A second set of variables was chosen as indicators of ‘substantive’ CSR, that is, poli-
cies which require real changes at the operational level and commitment of firm 
resources:
•• EMISS_RED: Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved on emis-
sion reduction? This can be seen as a substantive CSR policy, as a concrete goal 
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has been defined by the company for reducing its impact on the environment, 
against which progress can be measured. The achievement of this goal typically 
requires substantial investment of company resources, for example, in more envi-
ronmentally friendly machinery.
•• CSR_REP: Does the company publish a separate CSR/H&S/Sustainability report 
or publish a section in its annual report on CSR/H&S/Sustainability? Although 
the publication of a CSR report or section in the annual report is not in and of itself 
a guarantor of substantive CSR, the absence of such a report is an indicator that 
the company is not willing to publish information on its impact on the environ-
ment and society. Setting up systems to monitor and report on CSR impacts, such 
as environmental emissions and improvements in health and safety, requires an 
investment of the firm’s resources.
•• EMP_SEC: Does the company have a job security policy? The presence of a no-
layoff policy can be seen as a major voluntary commitment to the workforce, as it 
is not required by law in Germany. Employment protection legislation requires 
companies only to negotiate a ‘social plan’ with the works council when mass 
layoffs occur. A ‘no-layoff’ policy is therefore a substantive CSR policy which 
potentially could mean the expenditure of considerable company resources.
We hypothesize that workers as stakeholders have no direct interest in GLOB_COMP 
and PUB_COMM. We thus expect to see no relationship between codetermination strength 
and the presence of symbolic CSR at the firm level (Hypothesis 1a). In contrast, workers 
have an interest in promoting the last three policies listed above, as they are substantive and 
result in direct improvements for the workers. In the first case, since pollution can directly 
affect working conditions, workers have an interest in its reduction (EMISS_RED). 
Second, workers have an interest in company reporting on environmental and societal 
impacts, as an instrument for improving their access to information and for measuring 
progress (CSR_REP). Third, workers have an interest in company adoption of a no-layoff 
policy (EMP_SEC). Therefore, we expect that the strength of codetermination has a posi-
tive relationship with the presence of these three variables (Hypothesis 1b).
In order to test for a relationship between the strength of codetermination MB-ix and 
the five CSR policies, we conducted a multivariate logistic regression analysis (see 
appendix for details). To address the problem of the direction of causality, the MB-ix and 
ownership variables were lagged by one year. A number of control variables that could 
also be expected to influence the presence of these practices were also included:
•• Size: The size of the company (measured by the logarithm of sales), as larger 
companies generally have higher visibility and thus experience greater pressure to 
implement CSR policies. Matten and Moon (2008: 417) state that ‘explicit’ (i.e. 
voluntary) CSR in Europe is restricted for the most part to large firms. We would 
thus expect that size is positively related to CSR policies (Hypothesis 2).
•• Owner: The dispersion of ownership (measured by the percentage of shares held 
by small shareholders). The literature has conflicting expectations of the role of 
shareholders: some argue that large shareholders have a longer-term interest in the 
future of the company than smaller shareholders, since they cannot exit (sell off 
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their shares) as easily and possess the resources to influence company policies; 
others argue that pressure for CSR mainly comes from smaller investors, such as 
ethically oriented mutual funds or government pension funds. Thus, we have con-
flicting expectations with regards to ownership, on the one hand predicting a posi-
tive relationship between ownership dispersion and CSR policies (Hypothesis 3a) 
and on the other hand predicting a negative relationship (Hypothesis 3b).
•• Profit: The operating margin (difference between sales and costs, expressed as a 
percentage of total sales). As symbolic CSR has no costs, we would not expect a 
significant relationship between profitability and the first two indicators 
(Hypothesis 4a). However, as substantive CSR has real costs, we would expect a 
positive relationship between profit (as an indicator of the firm’s ability to finance 
CSR investments) and the three substantive CSR policies (Hypothesis 4b).
•• Construction, Manufacturing, Transport + Utilities, Trade, Finance and Services: 
Variables describing the main industry in which a company operates (measured by 
the Standard Industrial Classification code at the 1-digit level). The industry of 
operation defines important parameters for CSR, such as exposure to customers 
and the types of environmental and employment concerns the company faces 
(Knoppe, 2015). One hypothesis is that industries with the most direct contact 
with consumers (such as retail trade and services) should have the greatest interest 
in introducing CSR policies, particularly of the symbolic type. Therefore, there 
should be a positive relationship between CSR policies and the industry variables 
Trade and Services (Hypothesis 5a). Further, as transport and public utilities gen-
erate the most pollution and experience the greatest pressure for emissions reduc-
tion, we would expect a positive relationship between CSR policies and Transport 
and Utilities (Hypothesis 5b).
•• Time trend: As some CSR practices have become more prevalent in the recent 
past, we have included dummy variables for each year between 2007 and 2014 to 
identify any trends. The general expectation is that the trend should be positive 
(Hypothesis 6).
These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.
Results
Table 4 reports the results of the full models that we ran on the five CSR policies. Each 
model measures the impact of different variables on the probability that the firm has a 
specific type of CSR practice. The first two models are for symbolic CSR indicators, 
while the others are for substantive policies.
The first result is that the strength of codetermination (MB-ix) is not significant in the 
first two models, but is positively significant in models 3–5. In other words, codetermi-
nation is positively related to substantive but not to symbolic CSR, thus confirming 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. It seems that worker representatives use their voice to promote 
substantive CSR policies in which workers have an interest, including targets for reduc-
tion in emissions, CSR reporting and employment security, but appear to have little inter-
est in promoting symbolic CSR policies.
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The second result is that firm size has a significant positive relationship with all five 
CSR policies. This confirms Hypothesis 2, based on the observation by Matten and 
Moon (2008) that explicit CSR seems to be concentrated in large firms, which face more 
public scrutiny and pressure than smaller firms. This is the case for both symbolic and 
substantive CSR; large firms respond to higher visibility by implementing both types.
The third result is that ownership concentration is not a determinant of any of the five 
CSR policies; hence, neither Hypothesis 3a nor Hypothesis 3b is supported. In other 
words, there does not seem to be a systematic difference between large and small share-
holders regarding pressure exerted on companies for CSR. However, it may be that this 
Table 3. Hypotheses.
1a Codetermination is not related to symbolic CSR
1b Codetermination is positively related to substantive CSR
2 Size is positively related to all CSR policies
3a Ownership dispersal is positively related to CSR policies
3b Ownership dispersal is negatively related to CSR policies
4a Profit is not related to symbolic CSR
4b Profit is positively related to substantive CSR
5a CSR policies are positively related to Trade and Services
5b CSR policies are positively related to Transport + Utilities
6 Time trends for CSR policies should be positive
Table 4. Determinants of CSR Policies in German firms, 2007–2014.
Independent Variable Dependent Variable
 GLOB_COMP PUB_COMM EMISS_RED CSR_REP EMP_SEC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MB-ix ++ ++ ++
Owner  
Size +++ +++ ++ +++ +++
Profit +++
Construction  
Manufacturing  
Transport + Utilities –  
Trade – - – +++
Finance  
Services –  
Time trend increasing increasing increasing increasing no trend
Observations 595 595 595 595 595
Clusters 96 96 96 96 96
+++ = positive and significant at .01 level, ++ = positive and significant at .05 level, + = positive and signifi-
cant at .1 level, – = negative and significant at .05 level, - = negative and significant at .1 level.
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measure is not capturing important differences in investors’ orientation to CSR within 
each shareholder group. A further test of the influence of investors would involve coding 
shareholders based on their CSR orientation and including this in the analysis.
The fourth result is that profitability is not related to the symbolic CSR policies 
included in models 1 and 2. This is not surprising, as we expected in Hypothesis 4a that 
profit should not be relevant for CSR actions that involve no commitment of firm 
resources. In contrast, our expectation with regard to the relationship between profitabil-
ity and substantive CSR policies is only partially confirmed, as employment security is 
the only one of the three substantive policies tested which is positively related to profit-
ability. In short, profitability does not appear to influence symbolic CSR and also influ-
ences only some forms of substantive CSR. Thus, Hypothesis 4a is confirmed, whereas 
Hypothesis 4b is only partially confirmed.
The fifth result is that, contrary to our expectations, the trade sector appears to have 
weaker CSR policies, including both symbolic policies and one substantive policy (CSR 
reporting). One possible explanation is that companies in this sector may expect to have 
limited returns from CSR policies, as for the most part they sell products of other com-
panies and have no influence on the reputation of those products. Furthermore, they may 
be reluctant to publish CSR reports, given their lack of control over the supply chains. 
However, firms in trade are more likely to provide employment guarantees. One possible 
explanation is that retail and wholesale firms experience heavy seasonal fluctuations in 
sales, thus they experience pressure to provide employment guarantees to retain experi-
enced workers over the annual cycle. Firms in the service sector seem to have CSR poli-
cies in line with the average, with the exception of less frequent public commitments to 
CSR. Thus, Hypothesis 5a is not confirmed. Hypothesis 5b is also not confirmed, as 
firms in the transport and public utilities sectors have CSR policies in line with the aver-
age, with the exception of emission reduction targets, which they are less likely to adopt. 
It may be that these firms find it difficult to set such targets, as many transportation firms 
are expanding (particularly in the airline industry) and utilities such as electricity genera-
tion may have limited capacity to reduce emissions without implementing drastic meas-
ures such as shutting down plants. A final result is that, with the exception of no-layoff 
policies, the prevalence of both symbolic and substantive CSR policies is increasing.
Discussion and conclusion
This article contributes to the literatures on both codetermination and CSR, thereby bridg-
ing these two largely separate research traditions. With regard to the first, we expand our 
understanding of the impact of codetermination beyond financial outcomes. In order to do 
this, we utilized a new measure of codetermination strength, the Mitbestimmungsindex 
(MB-ix) which overcomes the restrictive assumptions made underlying conventional 
measures. With regard to CSR, this is one of the few quantitative studies that includes 
measures of collective labour representation as a determinant of policies.
The analysis we present shows that there is a differentiated relationship between 
codetermination and CSR. Symbolic CSR is designed to influence external stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the firm but does not involve any commitment of resources. Strength of 
codetermination is not related to the symbolic forms we analyse, membership of the UN 
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Global Compact and public commitments by top managers. By contrast, substantive 
CSR involves real changes to operations and requires the commitment of organizational 
resources. Codetermination strength is strongly and positively related to all three of the 
substantive types of CSR we examine, the adoption of targets for emissions reduction, 
the publication of a CSR report and commitment to employment security. This suggests 
that worker representatives are selective with regard to the policies they support: they 
appear less likely to support symbolic than substantive forms of CSR.
We also shed light on the debate in comparative CSR literature regarding the adoption 
of CSR policies in coordinated market economies like Germany. All five policies exam-
ined are of the ‘explicit’ variety, adopted voluntarily by companies. They are often sup-
posed to be most prevalent in liberal market economies like the USA and the UK where 
the need for business legitimacy is greatest. Matten and Moon (2008) note that explicit 
policies appear to be spreading to the coordinated market economies but that they are 
largely confined to larger companies and are for the most part encouraged by govern-
ments and industry associations. Our results suggest that worker representatives are also 
an important factor in explaining the spread of some types of explicit CSR policies to 
coordinated market economies.
A promising field for future research would be to supplement the quantitative 
research presented here with a set of case studies on how worker representatives 
decide on which CSR policies to support and how they use their influence. This could 
draw on the qualitative literature cited earlier (Hadwiger et al., 2017; Preuss et al., 
2015; Vitols, 2011). Furthermore, the type of CSR policies examined could be 
expanded to include substantive CSR policies in which it is not obvious that workers 
would have a direct interest. Finally, as the research here is limited to German com-
panies, it would be informative to examine the relationship between codetermination 
and CSR in other countries.
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